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Watergate, Multiple Conspiracies, and the
White House Tapes
Arnold Rochvarg*
On January 1, 1975, John Mitchell, former United States Attorney
General, John Ehrlichman, former Chief White House Assistant for
Domestic Affairs, H.R. Haldeman, former White House Chief of Staff, and
Robert Mardian, former Assistant Attorney General, were convicted of
conspiracy1 for their involvement in what is generally known as
“Watergate.”2 The Watergate conspiracy trial, presided over by Judge John
3
Sirica, had run from October 1, 1974 until December 27, 1974. The trial
included the in-court testimony of most of the figures involved in the
Watergate scandal,4 and the playing of thirty of the “White House tapes.”5
The purpose of this Symposium article is to discuss whether the evidence
presented at the Watergate trial is better understood as evidence of multiple
conspiracies, as argued by two of the defendants,6 or as a single conspiracy
as argued by the prosecution. The article first will set forth the law on
multiple conspiracies and apply that law to the evidence presented at the
Watergate conspiracy trial. The article will then discuss whether the
admission into evidence of certain White House tapes premised on the
single conspiracy view may have prejudiced any of the convicted
defendants.
I. THE LAW OF MULTIPLE CONSPIRACIES
It is not uncommon at a criminal conspiracy trial, or on appeal from a
conviction of conspiracy, for a defendant to argue that a guilty verdict for
*
Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. Professor Rochvarg was a member of the
legal defense team that represented Robert Mardian in the appeal of his conviction of conspiracy at the
Watergate   conspiracy   trial.      Mardian’s   conviction was reversed. United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d
973 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
1 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006).
2 United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom.,
Ehrlichman v. United States, 431 U.S. 933 (1977). Mitchell, Ehrlichman and Haldeman were also
convicted of various substantive offenses such as obstruction of justice, perjury, and false declarations
before a grand jury or court. Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 54.
3 Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 130 n.284.
4 Id. at 51. The most notable exceptions were former President Nixon and Gordon Liddy, neither
of whom testified. Id.
5 Id. at 108.
6 Both Mitchell, Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 91–92, and Mardian, Mardian, 546 F.2d at 975, raised
multiple conspiracy arguments on appeal.
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the conspiracy charged in the indictment is inappropriate because the
evidence at trial established that there were several separate conspiracies.7
Criminal indictments typically charge a group of defendants with being
conspirators in a single conspiracy.8 From the prosecution’s perspective, a
single conspiracy charge is advantageous because it permits acts and
statements of any of the defendants to be used against the other defendants.
Defendants usually argue for multiple conspiracies to avoid having the acts
and statements of others being admitted against them, as well as to demand
severance to obtain a separate trial.9 This section of the article will discuss
the various approaches courts have taken when deciding whether evidence
establishes a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies.
A.

Chain or Hub and Spoke Conspiracies
Some courts, when discussing the multiple conspiracy issue, focus on
whether the conspiracy is a “chain” or a “hub and spoke” conspiracy.10 A
chain conspiracy is treated as a single conspiracy, while a hub and spoke
conspiracy is treated as proof of multiple conspiracies.11
The classic case involving hub and spoke conspiracies is Kotteakos v.
United States,12 a 1946 opinion from the United States Supreme Court.
The criminal scheme in Kotteakos involved the procurement of fraudulent
loans to defraud the Federal Housing Administration.13 Simon Brown was
the “common and key” figure in all of the fraudulent loans.14 Brown
agreed with thirty-six persons to fraudulently procure loans for a five
percent commission.15 The multiple conspiracy issue presented was
whether the various persons for whom Brown procured loans were all
conspirators in one conspiracy along with Brown.16 The Court viewed the
defendants other than Brown as spokes emanating from the center hub
(Brown) who were all independent of each other.17 The proof at trial
“made out a case, not of a single conspiracy, but of several,
notwithstanding, only one was charged in the indictment.”18
The hub and spoke analogy has been discussed by many courts in
conspiracy prosecutions involving several criminal schemes.19 It is a
7 Herbert Wechsler, et al., The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Modern Penal Code of the
American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 980 (1961).
8 United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1389–90 (7th Cir. 1991).
9 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
10 United States v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796, 807 (11th Cir. 2004).
11 United States v. Swafford, 512 F.3d 833, 842 n.3 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 936 (2008).
12 Kotteakos, at 754–55.
13 Id. at 752.
14 Id. at 753.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 758.
17 Id. at 754–55.
18 Id. at 755.
19 See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 327 (3d Cir. 2010); United States
v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796, 807 (11th Cir. 2004).
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popular argument in wide-ranging drug conspiracies,20 as well as in
conspiracy cases involving a small number of defendants in non-drug
cases.21 For example, a hub and spoke conspiracy was found in United
States v. McDermott,22 which involved an investment banker who was
having an affair with an adult film star. As part of his affair, McDermott
passed on insider financial information to his paramour.23 Unknown to
McDermott, the film actress was having an affair with another man, and
during that affair, she passed on the insider information to him.24 Together
they made profits of over $170,000 in stock trades.25 The Second Circuit
reversed McDermott’s conviction of a single conspiracy involving all three
persons.26 In this case, the adult film actress was the hub and the two men
were the spokes with no conspiratorial relationship.
To be contrasted with hub and spoke conspiracies is the single chain
conspiracy. In the single chain conspiracy, each defendant is viewed as
linked to every other defendant despite the lack of direct communication or
contact with each other.27 Most chain conspiracy cases involve the
production, distribution, and sale of illegal drugs.28 For example, United
States v. Bruno29 held that smugglers, middlemen, and sellers of narcotics
were all members of one conspiracy under the chain conspiracy approach,
despite the lack of evidence of any cooperation or communication between
the smugglers and any sellers or between the different sellers in different
states.30
B.

The Agreement
Some courts, when discussing the multiple conspiracy issue, focus on
the agreement among the defendants.31 The classic case here is Braverman
v. United States,32 which involved a conspiracy to violate federal tax
laws.33 The United States Supreme Court held that the “precise nature and

20 See, e.g., United States v. Swafford, 512 F.3d 833 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 936 (2008);
United States v. Caldwell, 589 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 972 (2000).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1223
(2008); United States v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796 (11th Cir. 2004).
22 United States v. McDermott, 245 F.3d 133 (2d. Cir. 2001).
23 Id. at 138.
24 Id. at 136.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 142.
27 United States v. Robinson, 547 F.3d 632, 641 (6th Cir. 2008).
28 Id.
29 United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1939), rev’d  on   other   grounds, 308 U.S. 287
(1939).
30 Id. at 922.
31 See, e.g., United States v. Trainor, 477 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2007); United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions § 6.18.371H (2010).
32 Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942).
33 Id. at 50.
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extent of the conspiracy must be determined by reference to the agreement
which embraces and defines its objects.”34
It is possible for various persons to be parties to a single agreement,
and thus co-conspirators in a single conspiracy, even though they do not
know the identity of the other members of the conspiracy or are unaware of
the acts of the others.35 Nor does a single conspiracy become multiple
conspiracies because members drop out or are added.36 A defendant can be
part of a single conspiracy even if that defendant played only a small part
during a short time period of that conspiracy.37 Additionally, just because
there are different subgroups operating in different places, it does not mean
that there is more than one conspiracy.38 In all of these circumstances, as
long as there is a single agreement to which all defendants agreed, there is
one conspiracy of which all defendants are guilty.39
C.

Common Goal or Purpose
Another approach to the multiple conspiracy issue focuses on whether
the defendants charged with conspiracy had a common goal or purpose. In
Blumenthal v. United States,40 the Supreme Court found a single conspiracy
to acquire and sell whiskey at higher-than-authorized prices even though
there were several agreements because all the defendants “sought a
common end.”41 The multiple agreements were viewed not as proving
different conspiracies, but rather as “essential and integral steps” towards a
common goal.42 Courts typically define the “common goal” element of a
single conspiracy broadly. For example, in United States v. Moore,43
several correctional officers were found guilty of a single conspiracy for
engaging in sexual relations with female inmates.44 The defendants argued
that a single conspiracy did not exist because there were separate
agreements among different defendants to engage in sex with different
inmates.45
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this multiple conspiracy
argument, holding that the officers “had the common goal of trading sex
with inmates for contraband.”46 Elaborate drug conspiracy convictions
have been viewed as a single conspiracy despite the possible existence of
separate agreements. Courts have found a single conspiracy based on

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. at 53.
See, e.g., Kilgore v. State, 305 S.E.2d 82, 90 (Ga. 1983).
United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 699 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 917 (1999).
United States v. Padilla, 982 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 1992).
United States v. DiPasquale, 561 F. Supp. 1338, 1357 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
Id.
Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947).
Id. at 559.
Id.
United States v. Moore, 525 F.3d 1033 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1038–39.
Id. at 1041–42.
Id. at 1043.
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common goals of selling speed,47 trafficking cocaine,48 stealing money
from a union,49 and defrauding the federal government.50
When discussing the common purpose aspect of single or multiple
conspiracies, courts also consider whether the conspiracies were acting at
cross-purposes with each other.51 For example, in United States v.
Camiel,52 multiple conspiracies were found, contrary to the single
conspiracy charged in the indictment, when the alleged single conspiracy
consisted of two antagonistic factions.53
II. WATERGATE TRIAL EVIDENCE OF DIFFERENT CONSPIRACIES
The evidence presented during the Watergate conspiracy trial could be
viewed as supporting four different conspiracies: (1) the Ellsberg Break-In
Conspiracy; (2) the Watergate Break-In Conspiracy; (3) the Cover-Up
Conspiracy; and (4) the White House Conspiracy.
A.

The Ellsberg Break-In Conspiracy
Daniel Ellsberg was a military analyst who worked at the RAND
Corporation after serving at the Pentagon under Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara.54 Because of his high-level security clearance, Ellsberg
gained access to a group of highly classified documents regarding the
Vietnam War, which became known as the “Pentagon Papers.”55 These
documents demonstrated that the American public and Congress had been
deceived about many aspects of the Vietnam War.56 Ellsberg secretly made
copies of these documents and provided them to The New York Times
which, in June, 1971, published excerpts and commentary.57 Ellsberg also
provided copies to The Washington Post and other newspapers.58
The Nixon administration was very concerned about the publication of
these Vietnam War documents.59 Attorney General Mitchell ordered The

47

(1990).

See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1006

48 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 532 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555
U.S. 1120 (2009); United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 695–99 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 917
(1999).
49 United States v. Hemphill, 514 F.3d 1350, 1362–63 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1020
(2008).
50 United States v. Huff, 609 F.3d 1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010).
51 Kelly, 892 F.2d at 260.
52 United States v. Camiel, 689 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1982).
53 Id. at 36.
54 F.B.I. Continues Investigation of How Times Got Documents, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1971, at 15
[hereinafter F.B.I. Investigation].
55 The Covert War, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1971, at 38.
56 Neil Sheehan, Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces 3 Decades of Growing U.S.
Involvement, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1971, at 1.
57 Id.; F.B.I. Investigation, supra note 54, at 15.
58 Chalmers M. Roberts, Documents   Reveal   U.S.   Effort   in   ’54   to   Delay   Viet   Election, WASH.
POST, June 18, 1971, at A1.
59 Max Frankel, Court Step Likely, Return of Documents Asked in Telegram to Publisher, N.Y.
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New York Times to cease publication of the leaked information.60 When
the newspaper refused, the government sued to restrain publication.61 Most
significant to Watergate, in response to the Ellsberg leaks, a group known
as the “Plumbers” was organized inside the White House under the
supervision of John Ehrlichman to deal with national security leaks.62
One of the projects of the Plumbers was to discredit Daniel Ellsberg.63
A plan was devised to break into the offices of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist, Dr.
Lewis Fielding, to obtain medical records on Ellsberg which the White
House hoped would destroy Ellsberg’s credibility.64 Ehrlichman approved
this covert operation after receiving assurances that it could not be traced
back to the White House.65 On September 3, 1971, a group including
Gordon Liddy, Howard Hunt, and Bernard Barker burglarized Dr.
Fielding’s medical office—nothing on Ellsberg was found.66
The public did not learn of the Plumber’s’ break-in until April of 1973
when, during the criminal trial of Ellsberg for violating the Espionage Act
of 1917, information about the Plumbers’ burglary was revealed.67 This
revelation, along with revelations that the government had engaged in
illegal wiretapping of Ellsberg, and that the presiding judge, William
Matthew Bryne, Jr., had been offered the directorship of the FBI by John
Ehrlichman, led to the dismissal of all charges against Ellsberg.68
More than three full days at the Watergate conspiracy trial were
devoted to evidence involving the White House Plumbers’ break-in of
Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office.69 Although this evidence was most relevant
to John Ehrlichman, the prosecution’s position at the Watergate trial was
that it was “admissible against all [defendants] even though only
Ehrlichman had been personally involved in the actual authorization.”70
The prosecution argued that the burglary of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office
established a motive for the Watergate conspiracy charged in the
indictment.71 Some of the same persons who participated in the Ellsberg
TIMES, June 15, 1971, at 1.
60 Id.
61 Fred P. Graham, Argument Friday, Court Here Refuses to Order Return of Documents Now,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1971, at 1; Texts of Government Papers in Complaint Against the Times and
Judge’s  Order, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1971, at 18.
62 Earl Krogh, The Break-In That History Forgot, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at A17.
63 Id.
64 See Text of Ruling by Judge in Ellsberg Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1973, at 14.
65 The Plumbers, N.Y. TIMES M AG ., July 22, 1973, at 197.
66 Id.
67 See Martin Arnold, Ellsberg Lawyers Weigh New Motion for Dismissal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
1973, at 1.
68 See Guilty: The Government, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1973, at 32.
69 Brief for Robert C. Mardian at 4 [hereinafter MARDIAN’S BRIEF], United States v. Mardian,
546 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
70 Brief for the United States at 256 n.342 [hereinafter GOV’T BRIEF], United States v. Haldeman,
559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (No. 75-1381).
71 See Seymour M. Hersh, Prosecutors Feel Motive in Cover-Up Was Wish to Hide Ellsberg
Burglary, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1974, at 41.
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psychiatrist break-in had also participated in the Watergate break-in, most
prominently Gordon Liddy and Howard Hunt.72 Moreover, the Ellsberg
break-in conspiracy evidence explained Hunt’s threats after his Watergate
burglary arrest and conviction to expose the “seamy things” he had done
for the White House if his money demands were not met.73
B.

The Watergate Break-In Conspiracy
The Committee to Re-elect the President (CRP) was organized to run
Richard Nixon’s re-election campaign.74 It was understood that John
Mitchell would leave the post of Attorney General to become the head of
CRP, but until that time, the nominal head of CRP was Jeb Magruder.75 In
November of 1971, Mitchell, still Attorney General, along with John Dean,
who was Counsel to the President, interviewed Gordon Liddy for a position
76
at CRP. Liddy had been recommended to Dean by Egil Krogh,77 who
was in charge of the “Plumbers” and supervised by Ehrlichman.78 During
the interview, there was discussion of CRP’s intelligence needs.79 After
being hired, Liddy, along with Howard Hunt, began developing a political
espionage plan.80 At a meeting in January of 1972, Liddy presented to
Mitchell, Dean and Magruder a plan he called “Gemstone.”81 This
$1,000,000 plan included burglaries, electronic surveillance, kidnapping,
and prostitutes.82 Mitchell rejected the plan as not “quite what [he] had in
mind.”83 About one week later, Mitchell, Magruder, Dean and Liddy met
again in Mitchell’s office.84 The new plan’s budget was now $500,000.85
The revised plan still included burglaries and wiretaps.86 Mitchell refused
to give approval to this scaled-down plan on the basis that it was still too
costly.87 Dean commented at this meeting that the Attorney General’s
office was not the place that such plans should be discussed, and suggested
that Magruder be Liddy’s point person to provide cover for Mitchell.88

72 See Bob Woodward & Carl Bernstein, Break-In Memo Sent to Ehrlichman, W ASH . P OST , June
13, 1973, at A1.
73 See Transcript of Nixon Talks of March 21, 1973, W ASH . P OST , May 1, 1974, at A20; Walter
Pincus, Hearing Howard Hunt, WASH. POST , Sept. 23, 1973, at C6.
74 THEODORE H. W HITE , B REACH OF F AITH : THE F ALL OF R ICHARD N IXON 153 (1975).
75 Id.
76 Gov’t  Brief, supra note 70, at 11; Transcript of Record at 2627, 7675, United States v. John N.
Mitchell, et al., Criminal No. 74-110 (D.D.C 1975) (on file with author) [hereinafter Transcript].
77 Gov’t  Brief, supra note 70, at 11 n.8; Transcript at 7654–56.
78 Id. at 11 n.8.
79 Id. at 12; Transcript at 4117–20.
80 Gov’t  Brief, supra note 70, at 12.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.; Transcript at 2628–31.
84 Gov’t  Brief, supra note 70, at 12.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.; Transcript at 2632–34.
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Dean reported what occurred at this meeting to Haldeman.89 Both
Dean and Haldeman agreed that the White House should not be involved
with CRP’s illegal intelligence plans.90 However, Gordon Strachan, who
was Haldeman’s assistant, was kept informed by Magruder of Liddy’s
plans.91 When Mitchell, on March 30, 1972, approved a budget of
$250,000 for Liddy, Magruder informed Strachan of Mitchell’s approval.92
Thereafter, Liddy began receiving money from CRP to implement his
plan.93
On Memorial Day weekend, a team of burglars directed by Liddy and
Hunt broke into the Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters
in the Watergate office complex.94 The burglars photographed some
documents and installed wiretaps on telephones.95 A couple of weeks later,
Magruder showed Mitchell some of the photographs and information from
the wiretaps.96 Mitchell expressed dissatisfaction, and Magruder conveyed
Mitchell’s reaction to Liddy.97 Liddy explained to Magruder that the
listening devices were not working properly, but that this would be fixed.98
Liddy and Hunt then organized a second break-in
of the DNC offices.99
100
This second break-in occurred on June 17, 1972. This break-in led to the
arrest of not only Hunt and Liddy, but also James McCord, who was
employed as security director at CRP, as well as other men, including
Eugenio Martinez and Bernard Barker, who had participated in the break-in
of Dr. Fielding’s office.101 Hunt, Barker and three of the burglars pled
guilty to the burglary of the DNC offices.102 McCord and Liddy pled not
guilty, but were convicted at trial.103 Neither testified.104 Shortly before
the sentencing of all of those guilty in the DNC Watergate office burglary,
McCord sent a letter to Judge Sirica stating that there had been pressure
exerted upon him and the others to remain silent.105
The prosecution presented the evidence of the planning and execution
of the burglaries at the DNC offices at Watergate to establish motive for the
conspiracy charged in Count I of the Indictment against Mitchell,
Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 53.
Gov’t  Brief,  supra note 70, at 12; Transcript at 2635–36.
Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 53.
Id. at 52.
93 Gov’t  Brief,  supra note 70, at 13; Transcript at 3276–77.
94 Gov’t  Brief,  supra note 70, at 13; Transcript at 4139–44.
95 Gov’t  Brief,  supra note 70, at 13.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 13–14.
98 Id. at 14.
99 Id.
100 United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
101 Id. at 52 n.9. The other two men arrested inside the DNC offices were Frank Sturgis and
Virgilio Gonzales. Id.
102 CONG. QUARTERLY, WATERGATE: CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS 10 (Wayne Kelley ed., 1975).
103 Id.
104 Gov’t  Brief,  supra note 70, at 32.
105 CONG. QUARTERLY, supra note 102, at 10.
89
90
91
92
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Ehrlichman, Haldeman and Mardian. Although it appears it would have
been possible for Mitchell and perhaps Haldeman to have been charged
with conspiracy to burglarize the DNC offices, none of the defendants at
the Watergate conspiracy trial were charged with conspiracy relating to the
actual break-ins of the DNC offices in May and June of 1972.
C.

The Cover-Up Conspiracy
Once it became known that McCord had been arrested along with
others at the DNC offices at Watergate, various acts were committed in
order to cover up the fact that CRP and White House officials had planned
and organized the break-in.106 The prosecution’s evidence covered a wide
range of conspiratorial acts.107
Shortly after learning of McCord’s arrest, Mitchell, Mardian,
Magruder and Fred LaRue, another CRP official, arranged for Liddy to
seek Attorney General Richard Kleindienst’s aid in getting McCord
released from jail.108 Mitchell, Mardian, Magruder and LaRue also
participated in the issuance of a press release, approved by Haldeman, that
denied that McCord’s involvement with the DNC break-in was related to
his employment at CRP.109
In order to further disassociate any connection with those arrested at
the DNC offices at Watergate with CRP or the White House, Magruder
destroyed all papers relating to Liddy’s Gemstone plan.110 The prosecution
introduced evidence that implicated Mitchell, Mardian, LaRue, Dean, and
Strachan in this. Strachan also reported to Dean and Haldeman that he had
destroyed DNC wiretap reports and Watergate-related memos that he had
kept in his files. Additionally, Dean met with Ehrlichman and Charles
Colson, Special Counsel to the President, and they discussed having Hunt
leave the country.111 When Colson disclosed that Hunt had a safe in the
Executive Office Building that might contain embarrassing information,
Ehrlichman instructed Dean to have the safe opened and have its contents
removed.112
Evidence was presented about attempts to thwart the FBI investigation
into the Watergate break-in.113 Dean, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Mardian
were implicated in trying to get the CIA to take responsibility for the breakin.114 They also tracked the FBI investigation into the DNC burglary to

106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 53–54 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
CONG. QUARTERLY, supra note 102, at 9.
United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Id.
Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 53–54.
CONG. QUARTERLY, supra note 102, at 112.
Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 54.
CONG. QUARTERLY, supra note 102, at 820.
See id. at 66.
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determine if the FBI had any information tying the burglary to CRP or the
White House.115
Once it became clear that Liddy would be identified as the leader of
the burglary team, the conspirators developed various cover stories to
explain why approximately $199,000 in CRP funds had been given to
him.116 Such cover stories included that the money had been earmarked for
security at the upcoming Republican convention and for security for
surrogate speakers.117 Magruder rehearsed with Dean and Mitchell the
false cover story he intended to give to the grand jury investigating the
Watergate burglary.118 False information was also given to the FBI and the
grand jury by Mitchell and Ehrlichman.119
The cover-up also included the payment of hush money to those guilty
of the Watergate burglary.120 The persons involved with the hush money
payments included Herbert Kalmbach and Anthony Ulasewicz.121 As well
as payments of cash to the burglars, there were suggestions from the White
House of presidential clemency for the burglars.122
The efforts to keep the burglars quiet and not implicate anyone at CRP
or the White House appeared to be successful. Nixon had won a landslide
re-election in November 1972.123 During the early winter of 1973, Hunt
had pleaded guilty, as had four of the burglars.124 Although McCord and
Liddy pleaded not guilty and went to trial, neither testified.125 None of
those involved in the burglary tied it to CRP or the White House.126 But
inside the White House, Nixon, Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean were
especially concerned about Hunt.127 Hunt’s demands for money continued
after his guilty plea.128 Things changed, however, on March 19, 1973, the
day of sentencing for those guilty of the Watergate break-in, when McCord
wrote a letter to Judge Sirica revealing that the burglars had been forced to

CONG. QUARTERLY, supra note 102, at 812.
Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 54.
Gov’t  Brief,  supra note 70, at 22.
Id. at 23.
Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 59.
120 Id. at 55–57.
121 Gov’t  Brief,  supra note 70, at 26 n.33.
122 Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 56–57.
123 David S. Broder, Nixon Wins Landslide Victory; Democrats Hold Senate, House, WASH. POST,
Nov.
8,
1972,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2002/06/03/AR2005111001233.html.
124 CONG. QUARTERLY, supra note 102, at 10.
125 Gov’t  Brief,  supra note 70, at 32.
126 See
The
Watergate
Files,
GERALD
R.
FORD
LIBRARY
&
MUSEUM,
http://www.ford.utexas.edu/museum/exhibits/watergate_files/content.php?section=1&page=d
(last
visited Mar. 22, 2012).
127 Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 59.
128 See id. at 57   (explaining   that   Hunt  decided   to  plead   guilty   and  then   demanded   $122,000   “to  
settle  his  financial  affairs  before  sentencing”).
115
116
117
118
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remain silent, that perjury had been committed, and that others were
involved in the break-in.129
D.

The White House Conspiracy
McCord’s letter led to significant developments. Within a month of
the letter, Dean began cooperating with the prosecutors.130 Shortly
thereafter, Magruder and LaRue met with the prosecutors.131 Most of the
evidence presented at the Watergate conspiracy trial covering events after
McCord’s March 1973 letter focused on how Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and
Nixon sought to justify their actions in the pre-McCord letter period.132
Much of this evidence was presented through the White House tapes.133
Nixon told Ehrlichman that everyone should “have a straight damn
line[:] . . . we raised money for a purpose that we thought was perfectly
proper.”134 There were discussions in the White House to have Dean,
Mitchell and Magruder take all the blame in return for clemency.135 It was
thought at one point by those within the White House that no investigation
was likely of what happened after June 17, 1972 (the date of the break-in)
if Mitchell would step forward and admit his guilt for what happened
136
before June 17. Mitchell, however, was unwilling to take the blame.137
Dean was also seen as a possible scapegoat. On one White House
tape, Nixon told Ehrlichman and Haldeman that Dean should be told to
“look down the road . . . that there’s only one man that could restore him to
the ability to practice law.”138 After Dean refused Ehrlichman’s invitation
to meet, Nixon, Haldeman and Ehrlichman discussed a plan where the
“scenario” would be that when Dean failed to write a report on Watergate
as requested by Nixon, Nixon became suspicious and assigned Ehrlichman
to conduct an investigation, and Ehrlichman’s investigation revealed that
Dean was the main culprit.139 On the White House tapes, there was
discussion of the need “to put the wagons up around the President.”140
False testimony by Haldeman and Ehrlichman was part of this conspiracy.
Haldeman testified falsely before the Senate Select Committee about
Nixon’s response to raising $1,000,000 for the burglars—Haldeman

Id. at 58.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 59 n.25.
Id. at 57.
See id. at 58.
Id.
Gov’t  Brief,  supra note 70, at 38.
See Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 58, 59; Audio Tape: Transcript of a Recording of a Meeting
Between the President, H.R. Haldeman, and John Ehrlichman in the Oval Office, (April 16, 1973, at
10:50
to
11:04
A.M.)
(available
online
at
http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/
MRC/watergate.html).
140 Gov’t  Brief,  supra note 70, at 39.
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
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testified that Nixon stated “it would be wrong”—and Ehrlichman testified
falsely before the grand jury about his knowledge of the payment of hush
money.141
E.

The Conspiracy in the Indictment
Count One of the Indictment charged all defendants with conspiracy
to obstruct justice, make false statements to a government agency, commit
perjury, make false declarations, and defraud the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of
Justice, in connection with the federal investigation of the Watergate breakin and related matters in connection with the trial of the Watergate
burglars.142 In paragraph eleven of the Indictment, the purpose of the
conspiracy was stated as “concealing and causing to be concealed the
identities of the persons who were responsible for, participated in, and had
knowledge of (a) the activities which were the subject of the investigation
and trial [of the Watergate burglaries], and (b) other illegal and improper
activities.”143 The “investigation” set forth in paragraph eleven was
described in paragraph three as the investigation that began “on or about
June 17, 1972” to determine whether crimes “had been committed” and to
“identify” those who “had committed, caused the commission of, and
conspired to commit such violations.”144 Additionally, paragraph one of
the Indictment described the arrest of the Watergate burglars on June 17,
1972, and paragraph four referenced the indictment of the Watergate
burglars.145
The Indictment in paragraph sixteen listed forty-five overt acts in
chronological order, beginning with Mitchell’s request to Mardian on June
17, 1972 to tell Liddy to seek the help of Attorney General Kleindienst in
obtaining the release of one or more of the burglars arrested at the DNC
offices at Watergate, and ending with Ehrlichman telling Egil Krogh on
March 22, 1973 that Ehrlichman did not believe that Hunt would reveal the
burglary of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist.146 All of the overt acts of the
conspiracy charged in the indictment occurred during the period of what I
have labeled the “Cover-Up Conspiracy.”147 The majority of the overt acts
concerned the payment of hush money to the burglars during this
timeframe.148 As discussed above, the evidence presented at the trial

Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 59.
Id. at 120.
Id.
Texts of the Indictments by Watergate Jury in Alleged Ellsberg Break-in Conspiracy, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1974, at 14.
145 Indictment of John N. Mitchell, Harry R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman, Charles Colson,
Robert C. Mardian, Kenneth W. Parkinson, Gordon Strachan at 102–04 (1973) [hereinafter Indictment],
available at http://watergate.info/judiciary/APPII.PDF.
146 Id. at 109–17.
147 See discussion supra Part II(C).
148 Indictment, supra note 145, at 109–17.
141
142
143
144
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covered events outside the time frame of the conspiracy charged in the
indictment.149
The government’s position was that its case at the Watergate
conspiracy trial established a single extensive conspiracy
to obstruct a federal grand jury investigation into the 1972 burglaries and
bugging of the DNC headquarters in the Watergate building and related matters.
This conspiracy began within hours after the arrest of the burglars on June 17,
1972. The conspiracy was prompted by two considerations: that the Watergate
break-in had been approved by CRP officials and members of White House staff,
and that two leaders of the Watergate burglary, Hunt and Liddy, had previously
engaged in other unlawful activities for the White House, including the 1971
Ellsberg psychiatrist burglary. The conspirator’s motivation was their desire to
protect the Nixon administration.150

The government’s position was also that “from its inception, the
conspiracy necessarily included an agreement to conceal its existence and
membership.”151
III. WAS WATERGATE A SINGLE CONSPIRACY OR
MULTIPLE CONSPIRACIES?
As the previous discussion has outlined, the evidence at the Watergate
trial could be viewed as proving four separate conspiracies, not the single
conspiracy charged in the indictment. On the other hand, perhaps the
evidence is better described as a single conspiracy. Earlier in this article,
various approaches to the multiple conspiracy issue were discussed.152
This section will discuss these different approaches to the evidence
presented at the Watergate conspiracy trial.
It would appear that the evidence at the Watergate conspiracy trial did
not demonstrate multiple conspiracies under the hub and spoke approach.
Watergate did not emanate from one hub; no one person was at the center
of the scandal. Various persons took leadership roles at different times.
Although certain persons were more central to the conspiracy—for
example, John Dean—and others clearly played only a minor role—for
example, Fred LaRue—the minor figures cannot be viewed as mere spokes.
Moreover, in a hub and spoke conspiracy, each of the conspiratorial spokes
is usually acting independently of the others and is usually unaware of what
other conspirators are doing.153 Although in the Watergate conspiracy,
each defendant was not aware of every move made by the other
conspirators, there was awareness that the others were involved in similar

149 The first acts listed in the indictment occur in 1972; the evidence presented at the trial covered
events beginning in 1971. See The Plumbers, supra note 65.
150 Gov’t  Brief,  supra note 70, at 47-48.
151 Id. at 176.
152 See discussion supra Part I.
153 See discussion supra Part I(A).
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conduct aimed at hiding the roles played by CRP and White House
personnel in the DNC break-in.154
Compared to the hub and spoke conspiracy, the evidence presented at
the Watergate trial fits better into the single conspiracy chain conspiracy.
Watergate could be viewed as four conspiracies linked together. Even
though there may have been no direct communication or contact among all
of the conspirators, each played an important role in a conspiratorial
scheme to obtain intelligence on political enemies, and to conceal that
persons working for the Nixon White House and Nixon
re-election campaign were involved in these illegal intelligence gathering
acts.
The problem with the chain conspiracy analysis is that this chain
conspiracy was not the conspiracy alleged in the indictment. The
conspiracy of which defendants Mitchell, Ehrlichman, Haldeman and
Mardian were charged clearly did not cover the Ellsberg psychiatrist office
burglary or the DNC Watergate burglary.155 The first overt act of the
conspiracy charged in the indictment was just after the arrest of the
156
Watergate burglars on June 17, 1972.
Moreover, the prosecution
introduced evidence of the Ellsberg psychiatrist and DNC burglaries only
to establish motive for the conspiracy actually charged in the indictment.157
More problematic is the evidence relating to events after Dean and others
began cooperating with the prosecution. These events, especially the
words of Nixon, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman caught on tape, were not
aimed at hiding the identities of those responsible for the earlier burglaries,
but rather to get others to take the blame for those burglaries, and thus
protect the three men within the inner circle of the White House.158
Therefore, although the Watergate conspiracy is better viewed as a chain
conspiracy compared to a hub and spoke conspiracy, the chain conspiracy
approach is not an accurate description of the conspiracy charged in the
indictment.

See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 55, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Indictment, supra note 145, at 109; Brief Timeline of Events, WATERGATE.INFO,
http://watergate.info/chronology/brief.shtml (last visited Mar. 23, 2012).
156 Indictment, supra note 145, at 109.
157 See Haldeman,   559   F.2d   at   88   (“Objection   was   made   to   the   introduction   of   evidence   of   the  
Ellsberg break-in on the grounds that the prejudice engendered by the admission into evidence of such
prior acts of criminal misconduct outweighed their legitimate probative value. Ehrlichman br. at 45-53a;
Haldeman br. at 4. Rejecting this objection, the court admitted the evidence as being probative of
motive.”).
158 See id. at  58   (“Nixon,   Dean,   Mitchell,   Haldeman,  and  Ehrlichman  then   took   up   a   discussion
that had begun the day before: the best strategy for dealing with the upcoming Senate hearings. Despite
the previous day's plans, no one had the fortitude to suggest directly to Mitchell that he take the full
blame and go to jail to save the Nixon presidency. Lacking that alternative, they all focused on a plan
Nixon had discussed with Dean on March 17 indeed, it had been mentioned as an option for several
months. Dean would make a report to the President. It would be quite general and would indicate that
no  one  from  the  White  House  was  involved.”).
154
155
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If we focus on the agreement among the conspirators to determine
whether the Watergate conspiracy was a single conspiracy or multiple
conspiracies, the multiple conspiracy conclusion appears more accurate.
There were clearly four separate agreements: (1) an agreement to gather
information on Ellsberg by illegally obtaining his mental health records in
order to discredit him and hopefully discredit the Pentagon Papers; (2) an
agreement to gather information about Democratic Party officials and
candidates by illegally obtaining information in order to gain some political
advantage (although the exact reason for the Watergate burglary is still
subject to debate); (3) an agreement to conceal that persons who worked at
CRP and the White House had authorized the break-in; and (4) an
agreement to blame persons already identified to the prosecution by Dean
as solely responsible for the Watergate burglary and subsequent cover-up,
and to absolve Nixon, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman. It appears that none of
the four defendants convicted at the Watergate conspiracy trial, except for
perhaps Haldeman, were participants in all four agreements. The evidence
seems to support that Mitchell was not part of any agreement to burglarize
Ellsberg’s psychiatrist office, and not part of any agreement for him to take
the blame for the Watergate burglary.159 Ehrlichman was not part of any
agreement to burglarize the DNC offices.160 Most significantly, Robert
Mardian was clearly not a party to any agreement involving Ellsberg, the
actual Watergate break-in, or an agreement to protect White House
personnel and to place blame on those outside the White House, including
himself.161
Application of the “agreement” approach to multiple
conspiracies seems to provide the strongest support for the conclusion that
the evidence at the Watergate trial established multiple conspiracies
contrary to the single conspiracy charged in the indictment.
Whether the “common goal or purpose” approach leads to a multiple
conspiracy conclusion depends on how broadly we define the goal and
purpose of the conspirators. On the one hand, the purpose of all the
criminal conduct introduced at the Watergate trial could be viewed as
supporting and protecting the presidency of Richard Nixon. The
conspirator’s goal was to help Nixon exercise power, be re-elected, and
avoid impeachment. Although the precise goals may have shifted during
the full conspiratorial period, and not every conspirator was involved in all
See id. at 89.
Indictment, supra note 145, at  104  (“On  or  about  September  15,  1972,  in  connection  with  the  
said investigation, the Grand Jury returned an indictment in Criminal Case No. 1827-72 in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia charging Bernard L. Barker, Virgilio R. Gonzalez, E.
Howard Hunt, Jr., G. Gordon Liddy, Eugenio R. Martinez, James W. McCord, Jr., and Frank L. Sturgis
with conspiracy,  burglary  and  unlawful  endeavor  to  intercept  wire  communications.”).
161 See Haldeman,   559   F.2d   at   53   (“[I]n   an   apparent   effort   to   avoid   the   appearance   of   any   link  
between CRP and the burglars, Mitchell, Mardian, LaRue, and Magruder met and decided to contact the
new Attorney General, Richard Kleindienst, urging him to have McCord released from jail before the
police penetrated his alias. . . . Aware that McCord's true identity would come to light, Mardian,
Magruder, and LaRue the next day worked on a press release that would deny any CRP tie to the breakin.”).
159
160
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phases of the conspiracy, it could be argued that there was a common goal
of all the conspirators, and thus a single conspiracy. On the other hand, this
goal may be too broad. All of the overt acts set forth in the indictment
concerned only the goal of preventing disclosure that CRP and White
House personnel had planned and organized the DNC burglary. This goal
was thoroughly defeated in April 1973 when Dean and others began
cooperating with the prosecution.162 The goal of the next conspiracy, as
stated by chief special prosecutor James Neal, was to “put it all on Mr.
Mitchell, Mr. Magruder, and it also ropes in Mardian, LaRue, attorneys
O’Brien, Parkinson and so forth . . . . In other words, everybody except
that tight circle now within the wagons.”163 Additionally, the goal of the
Ellsberg psychiatrist burglary was limited to discrediting Ellsberg, not
gathering information for Nixon’s re-election campaign. The common goal
or purpose approach to conspiracies, like the agreement approach, seems to
lend more support to the view that the evidence at the Watergate trial
proved multiple conspiracies, although a broad application of the common
goal or purpose approach could lead to a single conspiracy conclusion.
IV. PREJUDICE
The possible conclusion that the evidence at the Watergate trial
proved multiple conspiracies as opposed to the single conspiracy charged
in the indictment does not mean that any defendant’s conviction should
have been reversed. The case law is very clear that proof of multiple
conspiracies is harmless error unless prejudice can be proven.164
Substantial prejudice from multiple conspiracies can be proven in several
ways. For example, if proof at trial differed so greatly from the indictment,
prejudice can be based on unfair surprise and inability to prepare an
adequate defense.165 A more typical prejudice claim is based on spillover.
Evidence of multiple conspiracies can confuse jurors who may transfer
proof of one of the conspiracies to a defendant involved in a different
conspiracy.166 Although some courts have stated that the risk of spillover
prejudice is less likely the fewer the defendants,167 courts have found
prejudicial spillover even when there were only three defendants.168
Another factor in evaluating spillover prejudice is the disparity in evidence
against different defendants. The greater the disparity, the more likely
spillover is prejudicial.169
Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 58.
Mardian’s  Brief,  supra note 69, at 63–64; Transcript at 9823.
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 757 (1946); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82
(1935); United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 706 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 917 (1999).
165 United States v. Richardson, 532 F.3d 1279, 1287 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1120
(2009).
166 United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 291 (3d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1223 (2008).
167 See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 25 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 972
(2000).
168 See, e.g., United States v. McDermott, 245 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2001).
169 Id.
162
163
164

Do Not Delete

2012]

8/1/2012 8:26 PM

Watergate, Multiple Conspiracies

58

Additionally, courts have emphasized that prejudice exists if the jury
transfers guilt from one defendant to another.170 Although courts have
recognized that proper jury instructions can diminish the likelihood of
prejudice, there are cases where the prejudicial spillover was so
overwhelming, limiting instructions were not adequate to eliminate
prejudice.171 Perhaps the most significant prejudice argument involves the
improper admission of hearsay statements under the co-conspirator
exception. If all defendants are co-conspirators in a single conspiracy, the
hearsay statements of any one defendant are admissible against every other
defendant.172 In a multiple conspiracy situation, the statements of members
of one conspiracy would not be properly admitted against defendants who
were members of a separate conspiracy.173 On the other hand, even if the
trial evidence established multiple conspiracies when the indictment
alleged a single conspiracy, no prejudice exists if a defendant participated
in the separate conspiracies.174 Moreover, proof of multiple conspiracies is
not prejudicial when the evidence of conspiracies not charged in the
indictment pertains to a chain of events explaining the context, motive, or
set-up of the conspiracy charged.175 It is not prejudicial to admit evidence
of other conspiracies linked in time and circumstances to the charged
conspiracy.176 Nor is it prejudicial to present to the jury evidence of other
conspiracies that are an “integral and a natural part” of the charged
conspiracy, or necessary to “complete the story” of the charged
conspiracy.177
It would seem that the only defendant convicted at the Watergate
conspiracy trial who might have been prejudiced by the proof of multiple
conspiracies was Robert Mardian. It is very doubtful that there was
substantial prejudice to Mitchell, Haldeman, or Ehrlichman.
First, Mardian was the only convicted defendant who was not a
member of more than one of the multiple conspiracies. As discussed
earlier in this article, Ehrlichman was a member of the Ellsberg
Conspiracy, the Cover-Up Conspiracy, and the White House Conspiracy.178
Mitchell was a member of the Break-In Conspiracy and the Cover-Up
Conspiracy. Haldeman, at the least, was a member of the Cover-Up
Conspiracy and White House Conspiracy, and possibly the Ellsberg
Conspiracy and Break-In Conspiracy. Therefore, the evidence pertaining
to the Ellsberg Conspiracy and Break-In Conspiracy could easily be viewed

170
171
172
173
174

(2009).
175
176
177
178

Richardson, 532 F.3d at 1279; Kemp, 500 F.3d at 291; Portela, 167 F.3d at 700.
See, e.g., McDermott, 245 F.3d at 139–40.
Portela, 167 F.3d at 702.
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 757 (1946).
United States v. Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d 411, 423 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 293
Richardson, 532 F.3d at 1287.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II(A)–(C).
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as providing the motive, context, and background for the participation of
Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Mitchell in the Cover-Up Conspiracy charged
in the indictment. Mardian, however, was not part of any conspiracy other
than the Cover-Up Conspiracy.
Secondly, there was a large disparity in the evidence against Mardian
compared to the other three convicted defendants. In over 1600 pages of
transcript of the direct and redirect testimony of government witnesses
(excluding discussions with the court or between counsel), and 670 pages
of White House tapes transcript, Mardian’s name appeared on 106 pages,
less than five percent of the transcript pages.179 The evidence against
Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Mitchell was overwhelming and greatly
exceeded the evidence against Mardian. This disparity in evidence lends
support that Mardian was prejudiced by the evidence of multiple
conspiracies.
Most significant to Mardian’s prejudice argument is the introduction
of the White House tapes into evidence at the Watergate Conspiracy trial.
These tapes were admitted under the co-conspirator exception to hearsay.180
If, however, the taped statements were made as part of a conspiracy
different than the one with which Mardian was a member, these taped
statements would be inadmissible against Mardian. This would also be
viewed as establishing prejudice from the proof of multiple conspiracies.
The White House tapes played for the jury at the Watergate
conspiracy trial included five references to Mardian.181 All five references
occurred during conversations on April 14 and 15, 1973, in which
Ehrlichman was reporting to Nixon what he had learned about Watergate
during his interviews with several persons during the previous ten days. 182
This was the time period of the “White House Conspiracy” during which
Nixon, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman were conspiring to place all the blame
on Dean and CRP officials such as Mitchell, Magruder, Mardian, and
LaRue—everybody except that “tight circle now within the wagons.”183
These tapes of White House conversations were admitted against Mardian
based on the prosecution’s position that statements among Ehrlichman,
Nixon, and Haldeman were in furtherance of the single conspiracy in the
indictment of which all four defendants were charged.184 To the extent that
the White House Conspiracy, however, was a different conspiracy than the
one alleged in the indictment, statements as part of and in furtherance of
the White House Conspiracy would not be part of or in furtherance of the
conspiracy of which Mardian was charged.

179
180
181
182
183
184

Mardian’s  Brief,  supra note 69, at 102.
United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Mardian’s  Brief,  supra note 69, at 63.
Id. at 63–64; Transcript at 9823.
Mardian, 546 F.2d at 978.
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The prejudice to Mardian by the statements on the White House tapes
is clear. In a conversation on April 14, 1973, Ehrlichman told Nixon and
Haldeman that he had a “bit of incidental intelligence” that Mardian had
developed an “elaborate cover story which he fed to The New York Times,
which lay it all back in the White House.”185 In a conversation later that
same day, Ehrlichman told Nixon that he had heard that the “U.S. Attorney
is hot after” Colson, Mitchell, Mardian, and Magruder.186 In another April
14, 1973 conversation, Ehrlichman, in discussing Dean’s involvement, told
Nixon and Haldeman that “Mardian and LaRue would say to Mitchell,
‘Mitch, you’ve got to do something about this,’ and Mitchell’s stock
answer was to turn to John Dean.”187 On April 15, 1973, Ehrlichman told
Nixon that “there was a cover story which Mardian and others cooked
up.”188 Another White House tape had Nixon telling Ehrlichman that
Mardian, LaRue, Kalmbach, and Dean “gotta have a straight damn line
that, of course we raised money. Be very honest about it. But, uh, we
raised money for a purpose we thought was perfectly proper.”189
Mardian had never spoken with Nixon, Haldeman, or Ehrlichman
about any Watergate-related matter.190 These taped conversations were
made after McCord had sent his letter to Judge Sirica, after Dean and
others had begun cooperating with the prosecution, and nine months after
Mardian had ceased being involved in any Watergate-related activities.
These White House taped conversations therefore could properly be viewed
as not during the course of or in furtherance of the Watergate Cover-up
Conspiracy alleged in the indictment of which Mardian was charged.
Mardian therefore would seem to have been prejudiced by the evidence of
multiple conspiracies.
CONCLUSION
On appeal of his Watergate conspiracy conviction, Mardian raised
several issues, including arguments dealing with multiple conspiracies and
with the White House tapes.191 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia sitting en banc unanimously reversed Mardian’s conviction
185 Audio Tape: Transcript of a Recording of a Meeting Among The President, H.R. Haldeman
and John Erlichman in the Executive Office Building (Apr. 14, 1973, at 8:55 to 11:31 A.M.)
[hereinafter
Recording
in
the
Executive
Office
Building],
available
at
http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearches/find/tapes/watergate/trial/exhibit_18.pdf.
186 Audio Tape: Transcript of a Recording of a Meeting Among the President, H.R. Haldeman,
and John Erlichman, the EOB (Apr.14, 1973, at 5:15 to 6:45 P.M.) available at
http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearches/find/tapes/watergate/trial/exhibit_20.pdf.
187 Recording in the Executive Office Building.
188 Audio Tape: Transcript of a Recording of a Meeting Between the President and John
Erlichman,
(April
15,
1973,
at
10:35
to
11:15
A.M.),
available
at
http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearches/find/tapes/watergate/trial/exhibit_23.pdf.
189 Audio Tape: Transcript of a Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between the President
and John Erlichman, (Apr. 14, 1973, at 11:22 to 11:53 P.M.), available at
http://nixon.archives.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/watergate/trial/transcripts.php.
190 United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
191 Id. at 977–78.
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based on severance.192 The court’s opinion was most influenced by the fact
that two weeks after the trial had started, Mardian’s lead counsel, David
Bress, had become very ill and was forced to leave the trial.193 A motion
for severance was filed, but denied by Judge Sirica.194 The Court of
Appeals held that “Mardian’s interest in being represented by counsel of
his own choice, combined with the disproportion of the evidence to his
potential prejudice, necessitated severance. On this ground, we reverse and
remand for a new trial.”195 The Court did not directly address the
admissibility of the White House Tapes.196 It did note,
Moreover, tape recordings of conversations between conspirators played an
undeniably important role in the prosecution’s case. Twenty-four of the 30 tapes
the prosecution played presented conversations that occurred during March and
April of 1973, further underscoring the significance of that time period. Mardian
was not a participant in any of the 30 taped conversations. His name was
mentioned five times on the tapes played to the jury. He challenged in timely
fashion each of the references as inadmissible and moved to have them deleted,
supporting his motion with a lengthy memorandum of points and authorities.
The court did delete a few references, but the five challenged here remained. 197

The court continued in a footnote:
In light of our disposition of the case, we need not determine the admissibility of
these references since the question, if it arises on retrial, will appear in a vastly
different setting. Even if some references are technically admissible under
various exceptions to the hearsay rule, the court is still called upon to exclude
evidence “‘if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.’” Rule 403, Fed.
R. Evid. When Mardian is retried singly, the major focus will be on the period of
June and July of 1972. Without the need to introduce evidence against other
defendants, the balance between relevance and prejudice of statements made in
March and April of 1973 may be substantially altered.198

The court’s opinion did not address the multiple conspiracy
argument.199 A few months after Mardian’s conviction was reversed, a
decision was made by special prosecutor Charles Ruff to drop all charges
against Mardian.200

192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200

Id. at 981.
Id. at 979.
Id.
Id. at 981.
See id. at 979–80.
Id. at 978.
Id. at 978 n.6.
See generally id.
Joyce Jensen, Mardian Charges Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1977, at E5.

